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Abstract Paleobiologists (and other historical scientists) often provide simple narra-
tives to explain complex, contingent episodes. These narratives are sometimes ‘one-shot 
hypotheses’ which are treated as being mutually exclusive with other possible expla-
nations of the target episode, and are thus extended to accommodate as much about 
the episode as possible. I argue that a provisional preference for such hypotheses pro-
vides two kinds of productive scaffolding. First, they generate ‘hypothetical difference-
makers’: one-shot hypotheses highlight and isolate empirically tractable dependencies 
between variables. Second, investigations of hypothetical difference-makers provision 
explanatory resources, the ‘raw materials’ for constructing more complex—and likely 
more adequate—explanations. Provisional preferences for simple, one-shot hypotheses 
in historical science, then, is defeasibly justified on indirect—strategic—grounds. My 
argument is made in reference to recent developments regarding the K–Pg extinction.
Keywords Explanation · Historical science · Mass extinction · Paleobiology · 
Pursuit · Simplicity
1 Introduction
Scientific assumptions, practices and preferences are often vindicated (or damned) 
in terms of well-grounded expectations about how the world is.1 I want to encour-
age a richer route to the epistemology of scientific preferences via consideration of 
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1 I don’t take myself to mean anything technical, weighty or special by ‘preference’ or ‘assumption’ here: 
some features of scientific practice are common, and I’ll take these to broadly fall into those categories. 
See Currie (2018a) for a discussion of this kind of defense of scientific practice in an ecological context.
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a type of explanation found in paleobiology (and historical science more generally): 
‘one-shot hypotheses’.
Hominid brain size evolution was driven by increased sociality (Dunbar 2009); 
sauropod gigantism evolved in response to high atmospheric oxygen (Berner et al. 
2007); feathers evolved for insulation (Prum 1999). Each of these explanations takes 
a complex history and accounts for it with a single factor. Indeed, the explanation is 
taken to be the explanation; that is, mutually exclusive with other hypotheses regard-
ing the target event. These are one shot hypotheses. Such explanations are not all 
paleobiologists are interested in, but considering the messiness of the biological 
past their frequency is surprising.2 Why would paleobiologists over-extend simple 
hypotheses so regularly?
I’m going to argue that one-shot hypotheses potentially play important roles in 
shaping paleobiological enquiry in fruitful, productive ways. They can aid understand-
ing of otherwise baffling events; they enable investigation of complex causal factors 
and facilitate their integration. I’ll emphasize how one-shot hypotheses—and simple 
narratives in paleobiology more generally—can provide these benefits even when we 
should expect them to be false. This, I think, is an example of the productive specula-
tion characteristic of the strategies historical scientists adopt (Currie 2018b; Currie & 
Sterelny 2017). Note that the epistemic defence I provide is provisional and defeasi-
ble. My argument is consistent with preferences for simplicity or one-shot hypotheses 
being on balance epistemologically harmful. No doubt psychological biases towards 
simplicity might mislead and problematically constrain scientific investigation. But to 
ascertain the pursuitability of scientific practices, we must weigh the good against the 
bad (Nyrup 2018), and in this paper I’m articulating the good.
This point—that I’m establishing the positive epistemic value one-shot hypoth-
eses could have—heads off a methodological worry. My focus is on a small set of 
hypotheses, and I picked them because they successfully illustrate the value I think 
one-shot hypotheses can have. But are these cases representative? There are also 
one-shot hypotheses which have not led to the kinds of benefits I identify. I’m not 
here making an inductive case to say that one-shot hypotheses always—or even fre-
quently—have such values. Rather, I’m arguing that in the best case, these are the 
epistemic dividends they bring (see Currie 2015a for a general defence of the use 
of case studies in philosophy of science). When considering a particular hypothesis, 
whether or not it brings such benefits plays an important part in establishing its pur-
suitworthiness or otherwise, but it does not exhaust the features that matter.
I’ll make my argument in light of some of the most famous one-shot hypoth-
eses in paleobiology: that an extraterrestrial impact, or massive volcanism, are to 
blame for the Cretaceous-Paleogene (K–Pg) extinction and subsequent mammalian 
radiation which ended the Mesozoic and ushered in the Cenozoic.3 I’ll start with 
2 My epistemic analysis doesn’t turn on the actual frequency of the use of one-shot hypotheses, however.
3 The K–Pg event is something of a touchstone in philosophical discussion of historical reconstruction. 
Carol Cleland makes prominent use of it in defending her ‘smoking gun’ account of historical method 
(2002), and to illustrate the inexactness of historical hypotheses (2013). Forber and Griffith (2011) 
appeal to it in defending their consilience-driven account. My treatment differs in part because the sci-
ence has moved on, in part because we have different focuses. I don’t think the philosophical points in 
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some conceptual housekeeping: I’ll identify the kind of simplicity I’m interested in 
and clarify the kind of argument I’ll be making. I’ll then delve into the case-stud-
ies to highlight the relevant features of one-shot hypotheses. With that in place, I’ll 
argue that one-shot hypotheses sometimes play an epistemically productive role in 
paleobiology.
2  Conceptual housekeeping
In this section I’ll first characterize a hitherto unnoticed kind of scientific simplic-
ity—‘narrative simplicity’—second distinguish between two ways of vindicating a 
scientific practice, preference or assumption.
2.1  Narrative simplicity
While philosophical discussion of simplicity has focused on theoretical and onto-
logical simplicity, I’ll introduce a further notion: narrative simplicity4 which builds 
on my previous distinction between simple and complex narratives (Currie 2014). 
With this in place I can zero-in on ‘one-shot’ hypotheses.
Theoretical simplicity can be understood as the number of variables and posits 
in a theoretical structure; ontological simplicity can be understood as the number 
of kinds, or the numbers of individuals, in a given ontology (i.e., Nolan 1997). The 
two might be closely related: if theories are representations of the world, then an 
accurate theory will be similarly simple (or complex) as the aspect of the world that 
theory represents (although accuracy is not the only, or main, criteria for a success-
ful representation, Potochnik 2017). Theoretical simplicity is mostly discussed in 
the philosophy of science in the context of debates about realism (e.g., Lipton 1993). 
Given that empirical evidence underdetermines how we should interpret even our 
most successful theories, perhaps appeal to super-empirical virtues ground argu-
ments for the truth of one interpretation or theory over another (Churchland 1982). 
Theoretical simplicity is amongst the grab-bag of super-empirical virtues (elegance, 
explanatory power, unification, etc.) which might do this inferential work.5 In meta-
physics, ontological simplicity is often used as a criteria for judging between various 
systems (as in Occam’s razor for instance). For example, David Lewis appeals to 
4 Bunge (1962) argues against the role of simplicity in philosophical analysis because of the sheer num-
ber of ways in which it might be understood. My claim here is simply that narrative simplicity differs 
from ontological and theoretical simplicity and that it appears to play an important role in shaping palae-
ontological investigation: I think it coheres with Bunge’s claim.
those papers or mine necessarily hinge on the details of how the science turns out (Currie 2015a; Turner 
2016).
Footnote 3 (continued)
5 For some possible lists of such virtues, see Kuhn (1977), Thagard (1978) and Goodman (1968).
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the (supposed) ontological simplicity of concreteness about possible worlds (Lewis 
1986).6
Narrative simplicity is different. The notion applies to a particular narrative, that 
is, an explanation of a particular as opposed to a general representation of how the 
world is. We can understand narrative simplicity as the sum of two features. The first 
is related to theoretical simplicity; the second relates to the simplicity of the narra-
tive itself. Let’s turn to ecology for a toy example of how this could go.
Here is a very simple ecological growth model:
where ΔN is the change in a population over time (assuming change is steady), B 
is birth rate, D death rate, I immigration and E emigration. Take the equation as 
a theory of population growth in the absence of resource constraints: it describes 
a modal space relevant to population change under those conditions. That modal 
space includes: circumstances where birth and immigration outweigh death and 
emigration, thus populations grow exponentially; circumstances where death and 
emigration outweigh birth and immigration, thus populations plummet; circum-
stances where things are balanced and the population remains steady. Consider the 
application of the theory to a particular instance. Imagine a recently introduced pop-
ulation on an island exhibits exponential population growth. We might explain this 
by situating the case within the modal space delineated by the model. Because births 
outweigh deaths, and the island is isolated, forbidding immigration or emigration, 
we should expect population numbers to increase exponentially.
So, we can understand a theory or model as describing a possibility space. Some 
narratives situate an instance within such possibility spaces, as we just saw in our 
toy case. I call such narratives embedded7 (Currie 2014). In this context, narra-
tive simplicity is parasitic on theoretical simplicity. If narratives involve situating 
instances in the possibility spaces theories describe, then the more complex a the-
ory, the more complex the narrative. Our toy case is embedded in a very simple 
theory, and so is a derivatively simple narrative as well. Distinguish between two 
related features of embeddedness. First, an embedded explanation might be applied 
to one instance of a set of actual events: if the K–Pg and the end-Permian extinction 
events were similarly triggered by mass volcanism, then we can treat them as tokens 
embedded in a common type. Second, explanations are situated within a possibility 
space delineated by a theory. Our theory of volcano-driven mass extinction accounts 
for the K–Pg extinction (if it does) by citing a set of conditions for the phenomena to 
occur and demonstrating that the case at hand meets those conditions (I consider this 
latter feature to be equivalent to treating the target as an instance of a set of possible 
events). The latter feature is, I think, primary, but for epistemic reasons the two are 
ΔN = B−D + I − E
7 ‘Embedded’ is perhaps misleading: by the term I mean the narrative is situated within a theory or 
model, as opposed to, say, being embedded in the structure of the world, or in many lines of evidence.
6 On my reading, Lewis argues that his inflation of world-tokens is less costly than the conceptual infla-
tion that he thinks ersatz realists need. He thinks adding more types of objects is a significant ontological 
cost, but that introducing more tokens is not.
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connected: without common instances we are unlikely to have sufficient understand-
ing to construct the embedding theory.8
However, some narratives do not situate their subjects within a single possibility 
space or theory. Instead, they describe complex sequences of change across time. 
Keeping with our toy example, say that our introduced population begins to oscil-
late at regular time intervals. As opposed to continually increasing, the population 
increases for a period, and then starts to decrease; this pattern is then repeated. We 
discover that this has occurred due to the introduction of a predator. We can under-
stand the new pattern using theories of predator–prey interaction, thus switching the 
space in which we situate our narrative. Where previously a simple growth equation 
would do, we now utilize a coupled differential equation. To explain the overall pat-
tern in the population, from exponential increase to oscillations, we need to do more 
than situate the instance within a modal space, but explain both shifts across that 
space, and changes to the space itself. Narrative complexity, then, is not parasitic on 
theoretical complexity alone, we need to also consider what I’ve called detail.9
A natural way of understanding detail is in terms of ‘difference-makers’. Dif-
ference-making is a popular way of understanding causation in scientific contexts. 
Following Woodward (2005), some variable is a difference-maker for some effect 
just in case, given some ideal intervention on that variable (ideal insofar as (1) we 
hold everything fixed downstream of the variable and (2) the intervention only has 
to be physically possible), the effect changes. The impact hypothesis is a rather stark 
example. Consider the counterfactual where everything on Earth 65.5 million years 
ago is kept as is, but the bolide’s trajectory is shifted such that it misses Earth, thus 
there is no impact. In this counterfactual, according to the hypothesis, there is no 
K–Pg extinction. As we increase the number of difference-makers cited in an expla-
nation, so we increase the narrative’s detail. In our original toy narrative, we cited 
the lack of resource constraints, the island’s isolation, and the birth/death rate of the 
population. With the introduction of predators, we add difference-makers relating to 
the dynamic of the new population, as well as their interactions with the original one 
(predation rate, for instance).10 Further, along a narrative a single difference-maker 
might be altered in different ways. So even if a narrative is embedded in a simple 
theory, it may be highly detailed if a cluster of changes to the theory’s variables are 
required.
Following Currie (2014), then, we can understand narrative simplicity and com-
plexity along two dimensions. First, embeddedness, that is, the extent to which the 
narrative is situated within a theory or model; second, detail, that is, the number of 
8 Note that I don’t necessarily take being embedded as a required feature of a narrative explanation: I am 
open to there being cases where narratives explain without appeal to theories.
9 One can situate both parts of the narrative within a predator–prey model by setting predator popula-
tion to zero in the initial stage. However, there are narratives where it is difficult to imagine them being 
embedded in a single model: consider my discussion of Sauropod gigantism, for instance (Currie 2014, 
2018b).
10 Embeddedness and detail are often coupled, as increases in difference-makers tend to undermine 
embeddedness—although this connection is far from logically necessary.
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difference-makers cited in the narrative. One-shot hypotheses are a subset of simple 
narratives.
We can understand one-shot hypotheses as being (1) simple narratives which are 
(2) treated as being mutually exclusive with other putative hypotheses. This mutual 
exclusivity motivates extension: scientists attempt to offer as full an explanation of 
the event as possible according to a few difference-makers against a ‘business-as-
usual’ backdrop. We might insist, for example, that the introduction of predators 
alone explains the change in dynamics of our toy population, and further insist that 
it is not due to, say, the population reaching the island’s carrying capacity. This 
combination of simplicity, mutual-exclusivity and extension generates the indirect 
epistemic benefits which underwrite my partial defence of one-shot hypotheses.
2.2  Epistemic value
Insofar as paleobiologists prefer one-shot hypotheses, is that preference justified? 
I want to answer with a qualified, highly context-sensitive ‘yes’. I happen to not 
think that we should expect narrative simplicity, or one-shot hypotheses, to reflect 
the structure of the world: that is, we shouldn’t expect macroevolutionary targets 
to be simple, and so shouldn’t take an explanation’s being simple as reason to think 
it likely. I do want to argue, however, that there is defeasible epistemic justification 
for the practice of provisionally preferring one-shot hypotheses. In this section, I’ll 
sketch a distinction which underwrites this claim.
Contrast two ways of vindicating a scientific practice. The first claims the prac-
tice is knowledge-tracking; the second claims the practice is knowledge-promoting. 
In the former case, we argue that the practice generates knowledge directly: it has 
features which either map onto the phenomenon at hand, or are in some way cru-
cial for the knowers to know that phenomenon. Knowledge-tracking, then, turns on 
ontological features of the target or epistemic features of the knower. Simplicity is 
knowledge-tracking if the world is simple, or if simplicity is critical for our achiev-
ing knowledge. Empirical adaptationists, for example, think that natural selection 
is a major cause of organismal form, and so we should expect adaptive explana-
tions to be true, and thus knowledge-tracking. Explanatory adaptationists take natu-
ral selection to answer one of the big questions about the living world—its apparent 
design—and so also think it is knowledge-tracking, but for reasons more to do with 
us as knowers than with the structure of the world (Godfrey-Smith 2001).
Second, we might argue that the practice is knowledge-promoting: that is, the 
practice indirectly increases the likelihood that some epistemic gains will be made. 
Here, whether the practice’s features map onto the target or is required for some 
epistemic achievement is irrelevant: rather, adopting the practice makes it more 
likely that knowledge will be had. Methodological adaptationists don’t think natu-
ral selection is necessarily so powerful in shaping life, but argue that starting with 
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adaptationist hypotheses is a productive way of proceeding (Godfrey-Smith 2001).11 
If simplicity is knowledge-promoting, then assuming or preferring simple hypoth-
eses will, in some contexts, direct research in productive ways.
We can understand the first kind of vindication as an appeal to epistemic ends: 
the practice directly targets epistemic aims-in-themselves; the second appeals to 
strategic goods: the practice is instrumentally valuable. Examples of epistemic ends 
might be accuracy, empirical adequacy, explanatory power, truth and understanding. 
Examples of strategic goods might be diversity, quantification (Steel 2010), or open-
ness. Strategic goods are strategic because they indirectly promote epistemic ends.12 
I’ll use knowledge-tracking and being an epistemic end; and knowledge-promoting 
and being a strategic good, interchangeably. Moreover, I don’t think strategic goods 
being strategic precludes them from being properly-speaking epistemic. The point of 
the distinction is to extend the space of epistemology to include knowledge-promot-
ing features.
Note that an epistemic defence of some practice might include both epistemic 
ends and strategic goods. In section four I’ll argue that simple narratives provide 
epistemic ends in virtue of being necessary for some kinds of understanding. In 
section five I’ll appeal to strategic goods: simple narratives are knowledge-promot-
ing. Note the assumed epistemic pluralism: scientists are not after truth alone, but 
a range of achievements: interventions, understanding of varying types, new phe-
nomena, and so forth. I don’t want to commit to a particular list of goods, but am 
happy so long as we admit some set of properly-speaking epistemic goods that go 
beyond truth. As we’ll see, this will be crucial in considering the kinds of epistemic 
value narrative simplicity might possess. And again, I take the distinction between 
knowledge-tracking and knowledge-promoting to extend the traditional boundaries 
of epistemology: I think knowledge-promoting features ought to be considered prop-
erly-speaking epistemic features (Steel 2010).
3  Big rocks and big volcanos
I’ve lain down two pieces of conceptual machinery. First, narrative simplicity. A 
narrative is simple to the extent to which it is (1) embedded in a simple theory; (2) is 
low detail, containing minimal difference-makers. I’ve further characterised a one-
shot hypothesis as a hypothesis which takes a simple narrative to be mutually exclu-
sive with others. It is represented as the explanation of an event. Second, a scientific 
practice, assumption or preference can be defended in virtue of being knowledge-
tracking or knowledge-promoting. The former directly provides epistemic ends, the 
other has strategic value: promoting knowledge indirectly. Before moving to my 
11 I am not here committed to saying that adaptationist hypotheses are defensible on the same grounds 
I defend for one-shot hypotheses, although they may well be (and indeed adaptationist hypotheses are 
often one-shots, although I’m unsure of their productivity).
12 Thanks to Rune Nyrup for the epistemic ends/strategic good terms.
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defence of one-shot hypotheses let’s consider a case-study: explanations of the K–Pg 
extinction.
In addition to distinguishing between simple and complex narratives, I have pre-
viously argued that historical science exhibits a progressive pattern (Currie 2014). 
First, a series of simple narratives are generated. Second, these are explored and 
tested against the historical record, some being discarded. Third, surviving narra-
tives are woven together into complex narratives.13 As we’ll see, this is true of work 
on the K–Pg extinction. One way of understanding the question I want to tackle is: 
given the shift from simple to complex, what value do the simple narratives have 
in the first place? Why not go straight to complex ones? In answering, I’ll focus on 
two one-shot hypotheses. According to the impact hypothesis the K–Pg mass extinc-
tion was triggered by a massive extra-terrestrial impact; according to the volcanism 
hypothesis massive volcanic activity takes the blame. A caveat: even if the explana-
tions are simple in my sense, the evidential situation is often bewilderingly com-
plex. My presentation here, then, only focuses on evidence where necessary. I’m 
interested in the form of the explanatory narratives and undoubtedly how the narra-
tives develop is in concert with empirical findings. Regardless, my presentation will 
necessarily be selective. It’s also worth noting that my presentation doesn’t turn on 
paleobiologists in fact taking the simple narratives to be mutually exclusive—they 
might not believe their one-shot hypotheses—what matters for my purposes is that 
they are treated as such.
According to the impact hypothesis, an extra-terrestrial impact was both the trig-
ger, and takes the majority of the causal blame, for the mass extinction dividing 
the Mesozoic and the Cenozoic. The hypothesis emerged in the early 1980s in a 
crowded marketplace of simple narratives (Alvarez et al. 1980). The basic structure 
of the hypothesis links the impact event to a scenario plausibly leading to a mass 
die-off. In addition to the immediate effect of the impact itself, downstream conse-
quences such as a long ‘winter’ causing mass loss of vegetation and acid rain (mak-
ing the ocean inhospitable) are a standard part of the story. Evidentially speaking, 
scientists work to establish (1) a correlation between the timing of the extinction and 
the impact; (2) trends in biodiversity leading up to the impact event; (3) the effects 
of the impact and their connection with the occurrence of mass extinctions.
Perhaps the most stark, and relatively recent, serious articulation of the impact 
hypothesis as a one-shot is Schulte et al. (2010), a 41 author review paper in Sci-
ence. The paper is plausibly understood as attempting to establish a consensus: “The 
temporal match between the ejecta layer and the onset of the extinctions and the 
agreement of ecological patterns in the fossil record with modelled environmen-
tal perturbations (for example, darkness and cooling) lead us to conclude that the 
Chicxulub impact triggered the mass extinction” (1214). They also highlighted the 
downstream effects of the impact such as “extended darkness, global cooling, and 
13 This contrasts with Cleland’s view (2002, 2011), which takes investigation to proceed by hunting 
for smoking guns which distinguish between hypothetical past causes. Note that on the face of it this 
involves taking the hypotheses to be mutually exclusive: Cleland appears to miss the importance of the 
simple narratives being integrated.
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acid rain” (1214). The narrative is presented (and treated) as being mutually exclu-
sive with others: Schulte et  al. argue for the impact hypothesis and against com-
petitors such as appeals to volcanism. Further, this involves extension: Schulte et al. 
attempt to account for as many features of the K–Pg event as possible by appeal to 
the impact. As such, it is a classic one-shot hypothesis.14
A critical part of the argument connecting impact to extinction concerns estab-
lishing a reasonable temporal relationship between them. This is tricky, as the fea-
tures of the impact are not perfectly distributed and biodiversity patterns in the fossil 
record are often noisy. A long-term source of resistance to the one-shot version of 
the hypothesis turned on whether the impact played a central role—wiping out thriv-
ing populations—or whether it was a final blow to already collapsing biota (Ward 
et al. 1991). Although a consensus has developed that biodiversity levels remained 
more-or-less stable up until the extinction, both the impact’s timing, and whether 
late-Cretaceous biota were destabilized, has been questioned.
Schulte et  al. (2010) is bundled with a set of response papers, most of which 
wrangle over various evidential features. Notably, a group of vertebrate paleobiol-
ogists complain that the account neglects non-oceanic life (Archibald et al. 2010). 
“… the simplistic extinction scenario presented in the Review has not stood up to 
the countless studies of how vertebrates and other terrestrial and marine organisms 
fared at the end of the Cretaceous” (973). They do not deny the impact’s impor-
tance in triggering the mass extinction. Rather, they claim it is insufficient for the 
terrestrial and freshwater extinctions that accompanied the oceanic biodiversity col-
lapse. Thus, they deny the sufficiency of the simple, one-shot narrative Schulte et al. 
accredit the impact.
The only hypothesis which has enjoyed anything like the impact hypothesis’ 
longevity highlights the role of volcanism (Courtillot 1990). The Deccan traps in 
west-central India record an extraordinary period of volcanic activity in the late Cre-
taceous. Volcanic disruption at that scale could have similar effects as large extra-
terrestrial impacts: enormous quantities of ash are ejected into the atmosphere, 
lowering global temperature, filling the sea with acid rain and darkening the skies 
leading to plummeting vegetative productivity. Volcanic activity is increasingly 
linked to other mass extinctions, most notably the enormous end-Permian event 
which coincides with the forming of the Siberian traps. Notably, where those favour-
ing the volcanic hypothesis embed it in a pattern of volcanic-driven mass extinctions 
(Ernst & Youbi 2017), those favouring the impact hypothesis emphasize particular-
ity: “Each mass extinction event should be considered relative to the record for that 
event, and we stress the unique aspects of the K–Pg boundary record” (Schulte et al. 
2010, 975).15 Not only is it thought that mass extinctions are not generally caused by 
15 This certainly wasn’t always true: the success of the impact hypothesis led to various models attempt-
ing to explain mass extinctions via extra-terrestrial impacts more generally. This doesn’t seem to have 
worked.
14 One non-paradigm feature is their insistence that the K–Pg be taken as a unique event, so although 
they do embed the event within a possible set of occurrences, they do not unify it with other actual 
events.
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impacts, but also that the specific features and location of the Chicxulub impact mat-
tered for triggering the extinction.
The volcanic hypothesis was long disregarded because Deccan volcanism began 
millions of years before the extinction. However, an increasingly fine-grained under-
standing of the record reveals the volcanism occurring over four pulses: the most 
violent being suggestively close to the K–Pg extinction. Gerta Keller is a notable 
hold-out regarding the impact hypothesis, defending a near one-shot version of the 
volcanism hypothesis instead: “[a] series of at least four massive volcanic eruptions 
in short order formed the longest lava flows on Earth and probably caused runa-
way effects, particularly ocean acidification, which resulted in the carbonate crisis 
commonly considered to be the prime cause for the mass extinction. The Chicxu-
lub impact played no role in this mass extinction” (Keller 2014, 29). She attempts 
to both undermine the temporal overlap between impact and extinction, as well as 
elaborating on Deccan volcanic activity.
Keller questions the timing of the impact. In particular, she worries that the 
apparent overlap between the impact and the extinction is due to the K–Pg line—the 
geological strata marking the extinction—coming to be defined in terms of the signs 
of the impact. “The Chicxulub impact is assumed to have caused the mass extinc-
tion, and this belief, rather than statigraphic data, has led to a redefinition of the K-T 
boundary based on Chicxulub impact ejecta” (2014, 26, her italics).16
In both Keller’s and Schulte et  al’s treatments, the impact and the volcanic 
hypotheses are treated as mutually exclusive: clashing one-shot explanations. But 
this is not the only way they have been conceived. Brusatte et al. (2015), argue that 
“…without the impact non-avian dinosaurs probably would not have completely 
died out” (638). However, they also emphasize how the late Cretaceous was, gener-
ally speaking, a time of major disruption: the extinction occurs “amidst a backdrop 
of massive volcanic eruptions, major changes in temperature and sea level, and the 
impact of a ~ 10-km-wide bolide”. They suggest that such disruptions could have 
decreased the resilience of terrestrial communities. As opposed to the impact upset-
ting typical background conditions, the fifteen million years leading to the extinction 
involved global temperature fluctuations between 8 °C, sea-level shifts from roughly 
current levels to over 70 m higher, and, of course, Deccan volcanism. The bolide 
impact did its work on potentially less resilient biota: the big rock might have been 
necessary for the extinction, but it was not sufficient.
Overall, then, we can see a consensus regarding the timing and central role of 
the impact emerging. However, that consensus also shifts from a simple narrative—
indeed, a one-shot hypothesis—to a complex one as the impact is situated within 
the disruptions of the late Cretaceous. It becomes unclear whether a single model 
can accommodate the explanation (embeddedness breaks down) as further differ-
ence-makers are implicated (detail increases). As I’ve argued we should expect, the 
16 I don’t mean to either support or deny Keller’s claim here—well above my paygrade. See Renne et al. 
(2013) for a more orthodox picture of increasingly precise measurement leading to a close association 
between impact and extinction.
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simple has become complex. Moreover, integrating the explanations requires aban-
doning the assumption that they are in conflict: mutual-exclusivity is jettisoned.17
So, is the apparent paleontological preference for one-shot hypotheses wrong-
headed? I don’t necessarily think so.
4  Narrative simplicity as an epistemic end
There are many ways of accounting for the assumptions and preference of scientists: 
the political, social and rhetorical play their role, as do more epistemic features. I’m 
going to focus on the latter here, but in doing so I don’t take myself to be in conflict 
with those other kinds of explanations. First, sometimes the epistemic emerges from 
the social (Longino 1990); second, both epistemic and more pragmatic features can 
together explain practices; third, even if scientists adopt practices for non-epistemic 
reasons, we can still ask whether those practices are epistemically valuable.
In this epistemic frame of mind, one might be forgiven for thinking that a pref-
erence for one-shot (or otherwise simple) narratives in paleobiology involves a 
mistaken assumption: that the world is simple, or that we should generally expect 
simple narratives to be true narratives. When confronted with mass extinctions, 
perhaps we should expect those events to follow similar trajectories—and thus be 
amenable to being embedded—or to have a small set of difference-makers—thus be 
amenable to low-detail representation. If that were the case, then we might interpret 
paleobiological practice as assuming that narrative simplicity is an epistemic end, 
indicative of truth. This would be unfortunate. I don’t think we’ve a general licence 
to expect history to be simple. It doesn’t follow from this that narrative simplicity 
is not knowledge-tracking, however: I’ll suggest that simple narratives could be a 
source of understanding, although not in a way amenable to one-shot hypotheses. As 
we’ll see in Sect. 5, however, the story doesn’t end there: much of the value of one-
shot hypotheses, when they have value, is strategic: they are knowledge-promoting.
4.1  Simple narratives and truth
Can we underwrite a justification for preferring one-shot hypotheses or simple nar-
ratives by appeal to epistemic ends: their being knowledge-tracking? One approach 
to this asks whether an explanation which posits a one-shot explanation is likely to 
be true in virtue of its simplicity. I think this is a bad move.
As we’ve seen, discussion of simplicity in the philosophy of science is often 
cashed out in terms of whether the virtue (if indeed it is a virtue) is truth-tracking. 
That is, is a simple explanation more likely to be true than a complex one? The 
move is a mistake because of the flexibility of narrative explanation: depending 
17 Derek Turner has pointed out to me that there are some contexts where establishing ‘the’ cause is 
more important: in legal, moral, or otherwise blame-or-credit establishing cases, perhaps. It may be that 
this defeasible preference is then transferred into other contexts.
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on how stringent we make our requirements for ‘truth’, being truth-tracking either 
becomes just about trivial, or far too difficult to achieve.
First, consider just-about-triviality. Narratives are explanatory in virtue of high-
lighting particular aspects of an otherwise complex world: they foreground and 
background various elements (Currie and Walsh 2019). It is plausible that which 
elements are so foregrounded and backgrounded depend crucially on context. One 
important element of that context is often the contrast class: an explanation does its 
work when it cites properties of the explanandum in virtue of which it differs from 
some set of otherwise similar events (Lipton 1990). Consider Schulte et al. (2010)’s 
insistence that we focus on the particulars of each extinction event. On that view, the 
K–Pg extinction is special because of the role of an extra-terrestrial impact; in that 
context, we foreground the impact’s role to distinguish that mass extinction from 
others. However, in other contexts we might be interested in similarities between 
mass extinctions. Schulte et al. do highlight the role of increased oceanic acidity in 
the K–Pg event, which was likely critical for other mass extinctions as well. Whether 
we ought to highlight the impact, or features downstream of it, appears to turn on 
features of explanatory context. It doesn’t follow from this that just anything can 
make it into an explanation: indeed, if Keller is right, then citing the impact event at 
all is a mistake as it did not have any effect on the extinction. However, truth enters 
into the picture at the level of potential elements that could be used in an explana-
tion, but whether I will be satisfied by a simple or complex explanation often turns 
on features of explanatory context. On this permissive conception, it is very easy for 
an explanation to be true—it just needs to cite the relevant elements given explana-
tory context—and so the simplicity or otherwise of a narrative doesn’t affect its truth 
per se, but rather its salience.18
Second, consider a more stringent approach: we might insist that we take one-
shot hypotheses as having direct truth values. Let’s start by getting clear on the 
nature of one-shot hypotheses, by returning to difference-making.
Read at face-value, the impact hypothesis concerns actual rather than potential 
difference-makers (Waters 2007). That is to say, the explanation doesn’t simply 
claim that one potential factor may have, or would have, made a difference (this is 
no how-possibly explanation). It rather says that the impact event in fact made a dif-
ference to the occurrence of the mass extinction.19 But more, it seems to claim that 
the impact was the major factor. To think simplicity indicates truth in this context, is 
to think that the thing you’re trying to explain is likely to be simple in that way. That 
is, a preference for one-shot hypotheses appears to commit to a picture of life’s his-
tory as being characteristically shaped by single difference-makers. The low-detail 
of the explanation, then, is justified because the world is shaped by such events. 
This seems extremely unlikely: I don’t see why we should think the world is shaped 
18 For further discussion of explanatory pluralism see Currie and Walsh (2019), Sterelny (1996) and 
Potochnik (2017).
19 The specific details of Waters’ view only captures the impact event awkwardly, as it requires for the 
variable in question to in fact vary and in fact make a difference across the relevant populations. The 
population of K–Pg extinction events is a population of 1, and the occurrence of the impact does not vary 
(See Currie 2018b, chapter 6 for pressure on Waters’ view from the perspective of historical science).
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by single difference-makers in that fashion. Moreover, the extension of one-shot 
hypotheses in particular makes them very unlikely to be true in this stringent sense.
So, to ask whether one-shot hypotheses are truth tracking (in virtue of being 
one-shot) we either make things too easy for ourselves by appealing to pragmatic 
features of explanation, or too hard by demanding that they pick out actual—and 
complete—difference-makers. As such, I don’t think we are licensed to think they 
are truth-tracking.20 We may want to make a stronger argument, that in fact we have 
good reason to expect narratives to be complex. We could appeal to my previously 
identified pattern of simplicity being abandoned for complexity and make an induc-
tion, or we could appeal to the nature and contingency of history. For instance, 
Beatty (1995) and McConwell (2019) suggest that the contingency of life at the 
macro-scale should lead us to expect biological kinds to be pluralistic and hetero-
geneous. This doesn’t in itself ground a preference for narrative complexity, but the 
bow between the two is perhaps not too long to be drawn. However, for my purposes 
such an argument is unnecessary.
I doubt there is an in-principle story to be told about whether we should expect 
macroevolutionary trends and events to be due to one-shot whammies or more com-
plex, multi-faceted causes.21 There may be particular contexts where we have well-
grounded reasons for thinking simple narratives are truth-tracking, but there is no 
general justification of this type to be had.
4.2  Simple narratives and understanding
Explanations are not merely supposed to be true, but also adequate, that is, succeed 
in generating epistemic goods we’re after—understanding for instance. I’m a plural-
ist about epistemic goods, and so epistemic ends needn’t be tied to ‘truth’ alone. 
Here, I’ll consider the relationship between simple narratives, one-shot hypotheses 
and understanding: I’ll suggest that even if the world isn’t simple, narrative simplic-
ity might generate epistemic goods in virtue of our needs qua epistemic agents. It is 
important to note that, even if the arguments of this section prove inconclusive, this 
doesn’t undermine the positive argument of the next section. That is, even if sim-
plicity is to at least some extent truth-tracking vis-à-vis biology’s past, that doesn’t 
mean that there aren’t other factors potentially vindicatory of such assumptions; and 
if simplicity sometimes generates understanding, that may not exhaust the prefer-
ence’s epistemic value.
A common thread in philosophy explains scientific simplicity as a symptom of 
our tendency to abstract and idealize: idealizations make tractable otherwise bewil-
dering systems, provide the right contrasts for explanation, and so on (Weisberg 
2007). With this in mind, we might argue that simple narratives, generally speaking, 
20 A related view, defended in Sober (1991) and endorsed in (Currie 2018b, chapter 6), is that appeals to 
virtues like simplicity are made in the light of local, justifying background theory. That is, we appeal to 
simplicity when we have some particular reason to expect it in the kind of system we’re examining.
21 For discussion of multifactorial causes in a future-facing context see Liu et al. (2018), Kareiva and 
Carranza (2018).
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are epistemically valuable for generating understanding. Consider embeddedness: it 
is plausible that conceiving of an instance as a token of a type—situating it within 
a model we understand—aids our grasping of the event. Consider being low-detail: 
citing one or a few causal factors lowers the cognitive load. Certainly, I am better 
placed to grasp a simple narrative, then I am a complex one.
Of course, understanding is not independent of truth: although to understand an 
event I might distort it in various ways, there are limits to how far things can bend. 
Catherine Elgin captures this insight: she takes understanding to be dual-natured 
(2007, 2017). To generate understanding of something, one must grasp it—fulfil 
some cognitive criteria (Strevens 2013)—and one’s conception of that thing must be 
sufficiently accurate—‘true enough’. On this approach we might say that even if the 
world isn’t itself complex, simplicity fulfils a critical cognitive criteria: it enables us 
to grasp the phenomena.
On approaches like Elgin’s, if we restrict our defence to epistemic ends, only 
simple narratives which represent the target event sufficiently well will be vin-
dicated. And potentially some do: if the consensus on the K–Pg extinction is cor-
rect, then although it leaves many details out, it may be that citing the impact is 
sufficient for my understanding the event at least in a coarse-grained way. However, 
such a defence, I think, is unavailable for one-shot hypotheses. This is because of 
their mutual-exclusivity. Appealing to idealizations in justifying simplistic assump-
tions is inherently pluralistic. What makes an idealization epistemically acceptable 
is whether it isolates the relevant features given our status as bounded epistemic 
agents: our cognitive capacities, explanatory interests, and so forth. And as these 
features of context shift so too does the adequacy of the idealization. As such, the 
monism implied by mutual exclusivity is erroneous. And so, even if some simple 
narratives are vindicated through the generation of understanding, one-shot hypoth-
eses are not.
I think focusing on epistemic ends sells one-shot hypotheses short. I want to 
argue that consideration of strategic goods suggests that there are reasons to some-
times prefer one-shot hypotheses and other simple narratives even when we don’t 
think they are true, or sufficiently accurate.
5  One‑shot hypotheses and knowledge‑promotion
Even though simple narratives are unlikely to be true, they might still be knowledge-
tracking insofar as they play a role in generating understanding. However, some sim-
ple narratives are unlikely to play this role, and the mutual exclusivity of one-shot 
hypotheses is particularly unsuited to generating understanding. But epistemic ends 
are not, I think, the whole story regarding the value of simplicity in narrative expla-
nations. In this section, I want to argue that simple narratives provide strategic value: 
they are knowledge-promoting. That is, simple narratives—one-shots in particular—
make it more likely that we’ll get true rich explanations. They do this by providing 
two kinds of services. First, they generate ‘hypothetical difference-makers’. Second, 
investigating hypothetical difference-makers provides ‘explanatory resources’ which 
may be integrated into more complex, sufficient, narratives.
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5.1  Hypothetical difference‑makers
It is sometimes noted that scientific progress is scaffolded: to get somewhere, you 
often need to get somewhere else first.22 I think one-shot hypotheses often act as 
hypothetical difference-makers. Recall that Ken Waters (2007) distinguishes between 
actual difference-makers—variables that in fact vary and make a difference in virtue 
of that—and potential difference-makers that would make a difference if only they 
varied. Most discussion of difference-making is factive: Waters’ distinction doesn’t 
differentiate between epistemic strength, but modal properties. That is, what makes 
a difference-maker actual or potential is not our credence, but whether the variable 
actually makes a difference, or would make one. By contrast, I’m interested in an 
epistemic, credence-based notion. Waters tells us what it takes to be a potential or 
actual difference-maker; we will examine how postulating such things might shape 
investigation. A ‘hypothetical difference-maker’, then, is putative: it might turn out 
to be neither actual nor potential (in Waters’ sense). But hypothesizing them enables 
their investigation: therein is the real value of one-shot hypotheses.23
One-shot hypotheses highlight a single variable against a relatively stable back-
ground. This motivates an investigative program targeting that variable’s effects 
and—as we’ll see in the next section—generates knowledge which is a precondi-
tion for understanding how that variable might interact with others. Further, their 
mutual exclusivity—and thus their extension—isolates that variable from others. To 
see hypothetical difference-makers in action, let’s start with Keller’s discussion of 
mercury proxies and volcanism.
As we saw in Sect. 3, Keller’s strategy is two-pronged: arguing that the impact 
actually occurred significantly earlier than is usually thought; building a case for 
Deccan volcanism overlapping with the extinction, and playing a prominent role in 
it. A crucial part of this second task involves developing proxies for volcanic activity 
which can be associated both with the temporal spans required and perhaps distin-
guishing volcanic-caused environmental changes from others. An important part of 
the puzzle involves mercury (Hg), an element that is both highly toxic, transportable 
over long distances, and long-lived. High oceanic Hg content has been associated 
with other major events which have potential links to volcanism; most strikingly the 
dramatic end-Permian mass extinction. Hg, then, might be an excellent empirical 
route for linking Deccan volcanism to the mass extinction. However, Hg fluctuations 
are not only chalked up to volcanic activity: variation in organic matter sequestra-
tion (that is, the absorption of dead organisms into the sea) can also have dramatic 
effects. So, simply measuring Hg content in strata is insufficient for isolating volcan-
ism. Font et al. (2016) develop a new statistical approach to Hg, normalizing results 
against total organic carbon and phyllosilicate content. This enables them to identify 
which aspects of mercury fluctuation are explained by background sequestration and 
22 For discussion of scaffolding in science, see Wimsatt (2007), Currie (2015b) and Walsh (2018).
23 This is related to the long-toothed distinguish between ‘how possible’ and ‘how actual’ explanations. 
However, on my view the credential versus factive readings of that distinction are so often conflated and 
confused that I’d rather avoid it.
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other factors, and which are likely due to volcanism. Developing the proxy involves 
more than figuring out how to measure Hg levels, but must be further tweaked to 
generate results relevant to the task at hand.
Font et  al’s technique is used to establish a mercury anomaly coinciding with 
the K–Pg extinction (“two orders of magnitude higher in the [relevant] stratigraphic 
interval” (173)!), and this in combination with various proxies of biodiversity stress 
attach shifts in mercury and biodiversity with volcanic activity and detach them 
from the impact. “[the markers] are present at the K–Pg boundary in both sections, 
suggesting that the Chicxulub impact had no environmental effects on their life and 
preservation. Therefore, these biodiversity proxies, together with the newly found 
Hg anomalies, provide new and promising clues…” (173).
It strikes me that the development of these novel proxies, such as measuring Hg 
against total organic carbon, is carried out against the backdrop of analysing the 
relationship between volcanism and the extinction. In particular, by isolating vol-
canic effects from other possible explanations the one-shot hypothesis leads us to 
consider the volcanos as hypothetical difference-makers, and this leads to the devel-
opment of proxies to help bridge the gap between the hypothetical and the plausible. 
Carrying out such a study certainly doesn’t require a one-shot hypothesis to be on 
the table, but I think it plausible that seeking out tests for hypotheses is an excel-
lent way of motivating such work. Font et al. are plausibly read as in the business 
of developing a proxy to test one-shot hypotheses. As they say “our study supports 
the use of Hg as a valuable volcanic… indicator and highlights its importance in 
the Deccan-related environmental changes at the onset of the KPg mass extinction” 
(173–174). There are at least two epistemic goods here: first, a deeper understand-
ing of how to identify and analyse mercury anomalies in the record; second, further 
empirical support for Keller’s hypothesis. Considering the volcano hypothesis as a 
one-shot is neither necessary nor constitutive of these goods, but I think it plausible 
that it’s being one-shot promotes those goods.
So, on this view one-shot hypotheses serve to isolate causal features and this 
drives us towards developing proxies in the historical record to distinguish between 
that cause and others. It strikes me that, even if Keller’s strong version of the volcan-
ism hypothesis is ultimately false, the strategic value is formidable; in testing the 
one-shot hypothesis, we develop tools—proxies—for further and carefully distin-
guishing between hypotheses. As such, they are knowledge-promoting. This point, 
I think, accords with Carol Cleland’s insight that historical science often proceeds 
by generating hypotheses and hunting for further traces (“smoking guns”) in order to 
distinguish between them (Cleland 2002). However, I think that one-shot hypotheses 
possess further strategic value.
To ascertain the potential explanatory power of a hypothetical difference-
maker, we don’t only need to establish proxies to ascertain its actuality, but 
also to understand the dynamics of such events. For the impact hypothesis to be 
plausible, we don’t simply want to show temporal overlap between impact and 
extinction, but tell a story about how the impact could have led to the extinction. 
This requires an understanding of the relevant causal dynamics, and I think one-
shot hypotheses motivate such studies and facilitate them by isolating hypotheti-
cal difference-makers. Their mutual exclusivity and over-extension motivates a 
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thorough examination of the relationship between that variable and mass-extinc-
tion scenarios. To illustrate this I’ll turn to a different hypothetical difference-
maker concerning the extinction: the role of terrestrial community structure. This 
case both motivates my point, and sets us up for the next subsection.
Although there is now general agreement that biodiversity levels leading up 
to the K–Pg extinction were more-or-less steady, subtler changes in community 
structure could have been a crucial precursor to the extinction event. Mitchell 
et al. (2012) consider just such a case (see also Brusatte et al. 2015). Their worry 
is partly driven by the thought that any particular one-shot hypothesis looks 
insufficient to explain the occurrence of mass extinctions, because major vol-
canic events and major impacts occur with different frequencies than mass extinc-
tions. They’re interested, then, in whether changes across late Cretaceous diver-
sity could have led to less resilience in terrestrial communities. “We compared 
the robustness of Campanian and Maastrichtian communities to test whether 
disturbances could cause extinctions more easily in Maastrichtian communities 
than earlier Campanian ones by using a food-web model… that is specifically 
designed to accommodate the uncertainties of fossil data” (18857). Such a test 
doesn’t simply involve understanding the empirical proxies related to biodiver-
sity, but understanding the dynamics of ecological communities: the food-web 
model expresses a rich conception of the relationship between community struc-
ture and resilience. For instance, one aspect of the approach is to use modelling 
to compare the effects of a hypothetical impact to the effects of the actual impact.
[I]n the Maastrichtian of North America not only were more taxa driven 
to extinction than would have been the case in a hypothetical Campanian 
extinction, but the guilds that were most strongly affected, and thus the 
clades that were hit hardest, also differed. Localities in the two intervals 
differ in the taxon richness of several guilds, including the very large herbi-
vores… (18859).
Mitchell, Roopnarine and Angielczyk identify shifts in the diversity of large her-
bivorous dinosaurs as making a critical difference to the extinction.
This guild was highly influential because of its high number of connections 
in the food web: very large herbivores would have been prey of small preda-
tors (or juvenile larger predators) when young, moderately sized predators 
when juveniles, and top predators during adulthood… The removal of such 
highly connected species can have disastrous effects on communities, so the 
impact of the complete removal of guilds such as the very large herbivores 
can ripple through the food web in myriad ways (18859).
Comparing the actual mass extinction with potential extinctions is underwritten 
by a firm grasp of ecological dynamics, and provides insight into how ecologi-
cal factors may have affected the K–Pg scenario, as well as other events. Thus, 
such modelling involves the application and development of our understanding of 
ecological dynamics. Again the capacity of one-shot hypotheses to isolate such 
features, and consider their modal properties in that light, provides rich epistemic 
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dividends. It turns out that the truth or otherwise of one-shot hypotheses is not 
what matters in their vindication: in fact, their falsity potentially promotes truth 
(Wimsatt 2007). A perhaps useful metaphor for seeing the importance of mutu-
ally exclusive, extended hypothetical difference-makers appeals to the role of 
isolation in experimentation. Experiments uncover causal relations between 
variables by making interventions in simple physical systems. The dependency 
between a particular variable and an effect is generated by holding the system 
fixed, and surgically and repeatedly intervening on the variable of interest in iso-
lation (Currie and Levy 2018, Woodward 2005 and Cleland 2002). Although one-
shot hypotheses do not literally enable experimentation, they do facilitate a kind 
of isolation, and this motivates investigations leading to rich understanding of 
those features and dependencies.
As we’ll see in the next section, understanding both the dynamics and proxies 
associated with hypothetical difference-makers matters for developing richer, more 
complex explanations: they provide what I’ll call ‘explanatory resources’.
5.2  Explanatory resources
Since 1980 we’ve seen a lot of progress on understanding the dynamics and proxies 
of a large set of hypothetical difference-makers related to mass extinctions: relation-
ships between global temperatures, sea-levels, oceanic acidity, atmospheric shifts, 
extra-terrestrial impacts, volcanism, community structures, and so on. This progress 
provisions paleobiologists and geologists with a rich palette of options for construct-
ing and testing much more complex, rich explorations of the past. Hypothetical dif-
ference-makers become explanatory resources which can be integrated into larger 
narratives. In the last subsection I argued that one-shot hypotheses (and likely other 
simple narratives) scaffold investigation by acting as hypothetical difference-makers; 
I’ll now show how one-shot hypotheses are transformed into explanatory resources, 
used for constructing complex narratives.24 In doing so, mutual exclusivity is jetti-
soned and extension is reduced.
Complex narratives are less embedded and more detailed than simple narratives, 
and as we’ve seen, I think we see a shift from simple to complex as historical recon-
struction progresses. On my view, considering one-shot and other simple narratives 
provides investigative scaffolds for richer understanding of the dynamics and proxies 
associated with those hypothetical difference-makers and this underwrites the con-
struction and testing of richer narratives. As such, they are knowledge-promoting.
As we saw above, it is striking that both large impacts and increased volcan-
ism occur with differing frequency than mass extinctions—this in itself grants 
24 Ernst and Youbi (2017), drawing on improved timing estimates, provide a general model of the 
relationship between mass extinction events and the impressive volcanism built around large igneous 
provinces (such as the Siberian traps). In order to build such a model and make it at all plausible, rich 
understanding of both empirical proxies and the kinds of dynamics such systems exhibit are necessary. 
Explanatory resources generated from consideration of one-shot hypotheses, then, can also be important 
for building such models.
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plausibility to the idea that they alone are not sufficient causes (White & Saunders 
2005): we should doubt that one-shot hypotheses are likely to be true or sufficient 
in these circumstances. However, to build rich, complex explanations, we need suf-
ficient explanatory resources: we need to understand the proxies and dynamics of 
the factors we wish to integrate. We saw an example of this in Sect. 3, where Bru-
satte et al. (2015) situated the impact event within other late-Cretaceous disruptions, 
and their possible effect upon terrestrial community structures. Such complex narra-
tives can be imagined, of course, but for them to be empirically fruitful we need the 
kind of deep understanding of proxies and dynamics which investigation of one-shot 
hypotheses facilitates. For instance, Mitchell et al. (2012)’s application of ecological 
food-webs to Cretaceous communities, and Font et al. (2016)’s development of Hg 
proxies of volcanic activities, each generated explanatory resources which can then 
be knit together into complex narratives.
A striking example is the hypothesis that not only were the Deccan volcanoes 
and the Chicxulub impact each partially to blame for the extinction, but that the 
two were themselves linked: in particular, that the Chicxulub impact itself triggered 
the worst of the eruptions.25 Richards et al. (2015) suspect this idea is right. Their 
suspicions are motivated by two things: first, dating suggesting that the impact and 
the main pulse Deccan eruptions (which accounted for more than 70% of the vol-
canic activity) may have occurred within the same century; second, evidence that 
earthquakes generate eruptions. Richards et al. point out that the probability of both 
Deccan-style volcanism and (in particular) Chicxulub-scale impact events are very 
low, such that the probability of both occurring more-or-less simultaneously is van-
ishingly small if the events are independent. Thus, perhaps they were not independ-
ent. They ask, then, whether an impact like the Chicxulub event might be sufficient 
to set off the third dramatic pulse of volcanic activity. Although Richards et al. are 
certainly not the first to mention this possibility (indeed, it is briefly considered in 
Alvarez et al., 1980), only once sufficient proxies have enabled more precise timing, 
and sufficient understanding of both impacts and volcanism have been developed, 
did the more complex narrative start to bear empirical fruit. That is, a precondition 
for such complex narrates to be empirically fruitful—for the speculation to be pro-
ductive in myself & Sterelny’s sense (2017)—is having sufficient understanding of 
the features cited in the narratives: and simple narratives (one-shots in particular) 
provide an investigative context to generate just such knowledge.
Richards et al. begin by arguing that current models do not explain the power of 
the Deccan’s main pulse, then consider whether a large impact could have achieved 
this and finally link their hypothesis to a body of independent evidence. They cite a 
body of work linking volcanic eruptions to seismic activity: 40% of volcanic erup-
tions occur within a few days of a quake, and quakes clearly have other geofluidic 
effects (triggering geysers for instance). Although the mechanisms by which earth-
quakes achieve this are unknown, Manga and Brodsky (2006) examined patterns of 
correlations between earthquake occurrence, size and distance, and volcanic activity, 
25 This is potentially an example of how linking hypotheses about the past together can further our epis-
temic reach, as Currie (2016) has argued.
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to build a model relating the two. Richards et al. draw on estimates of the earthquake 
potential of the Chicxulub impact, and then scale these to Manga and Brodsky’s 
model. They thus argue that “according to historical evidence [such impact energies] 
appear to be large enough to trigger volcanic eruptions worldwide” (1513). Note 
that although this affords a triggering role to the impact, the increased volcanism 
throughout the late Cretaceous now plays a prominent role both as a precondition for 
the extinction and a star player in the extinction-causing cascade downstream of the 
impact.
The implication of all this is that perhaps indeed the impact provided the trigger 
for the extinction, but its tumultuous action was carried out via the Deccan volca-
noes. That is to say, the K–Pg extinction was a complex event not amenable to a low 
detail, one-shot explanation. But to get there, it seems to me, the consideration of 
one-shot hypotheses was critical.
6  Conclusion
I hope to have decoupled the justification of one-shot and other simple hypotheses 
from considerations of their truth or otherwise. Gerta Keller’s argument against the 
impact hypothesis pushes against a quite powerful apparent consensus vis-à-vis the 
K–Pg extinction; as such, we might wish to bet against her hypothesis. But such bets 
are often besides the point: developing new proxies (for instance, signalling rela-
tions between mercury and mass volcanic activity), as well as further understanding 
dynamics (between, say, increased volcanism and global temperature) are impres-
sive epistemic achievements regardless. Further, such new knowledge forms the 
basis of richer, integrative explanations. If the consensus around impact and extinc-
tion holds, it is worth noting that the shape of the impact hypothesis has changed: it 
has become further situated within the specific circumstances of the late-Cretaceous; 
progressed from simple to complex. And this shift was facilitated, and motivated, by 
consideration of one-shot hypotheses.
Decoupling truth from epistemic value has insights about the kinds of strate-
gies historical scientists adopt in uncovering the past. As Derek Turner has recently 
stressed, being a palaeontologist is not simply about making retrodictions: one must 
also make predictions about which research avenues will be fruitful (Turner 2016). 
In understanding those strategies we must include not only epistemic ends but stra-
tegic goods as well. The importance of such features, it seems to me, itself motivates 
a broader conception of epistemology: strategic goods are, I think, epistemic goods 
properly speaking.
There are pressing issues that I have left unexplored. For one thing, what 
propositional attitude ought we, or scientists, adopt towards one-shot hypothe-
ses? Should we believe them or not? And further, by what mechanisms are one-
shot hypotheses productive, when they are? Instead of taking scientists examin-
ing one-shot hypotheses to be seriously considering—being realists about—such 
hypotheses, we could interpret them as generating and testing hypothetical 
difference-makers. That is, one-shot hypotheses might be epistemically accept-
able, but not belief-worthy (Potochnik 2017). Having said this, it might be that, 
1 3
Simplicity, one‑shot hypotheses and paleobiological… Page 21 of 24    10 
psychologically speaking, scientists in fact believing one-shot hypotheses plays 
a crucial role in motivating the kinds of benefits I’ve highlighted here. For 
instance, stubbornness might be an important quality for pushing against consen-
sus as Keller does, and this might psychologically require realism about one-shot 
hypotheses.
That is, psychological belief might be part of the mechanisms by which one-
shot hypotheses provide their epistemic goods, and I’ve been largely silent about 
mechanisms. For instance, such hypotheses are sexy, and this may aid in publi-
cation, funding, and dissemination. Given science’s incentive structure, chasing 
one-shot hypotheses might be a good strategy. In those circumstances, we might 
agree that in principle believing or otherwise in one-shot hypotheses is not the 
point, but that in practice the motivation of belief is important. An anonymous 
referee makes the fascinating suggestion that the preference might be due to sci-
entists’ possessing a simplistic, hypothetico-deductive model of scientific method, 
and this leads them to favour one-shots. If so, this might lead us to ask whether 
such philosophical views are themselves knowledge-promoting when held by sci-
entists, and if so under which conditions. I think establishing the mechanisms 
through which one-shots do their work (when they do) might require fine-grained 
sociological investigation of scientists’ behaviours.
For another thing, I haven’t discussed when one-shot (or simple) hypotheses go 
wrong. If Keller is right, for instance, our commitment to the impact hypothesis 
has been unproductive; our biases towards psychologically satisfying explana-
tions might lead us to miss fruitful research avenues. I take these worries seri-
ously, but my task in this paper—articulating the positive epistemic value such 
hypothesizing in paleobiology might generate—is a valuable part of the question 
of pursuitability.
However you want to jump on such questions, I take myself to have provided a 
kind of epistemic vindication for a provisional assumption or preference in paleo-
biology favouring one-shot hypotheses. I want to note two lessons in closing. First, 
if one-shot hypotheses are primarily valuable for providing hypothetical difference-
makers, and thus providing explanatory resources, then we might think that consen-
suses forming around such hypotheses are problematic. Their function is to promote 
productive investigation, not get things right. As such, it is plausible that a diversity 
of one-shots is desired. My view, then, I think promotes certain forms of pluralism 
(similar to, say Chang 2012). Second, I think there is a more general lesson here for 
normative examinations and critiques of scientific practices. In addition to simply 
asking after the direct—intrinsic—epistemic value of some practice, whether it is 
knowledge-tracking, we should also ask to what extent those practices have strategic 
value. How do they, say, shape epistemic communities towards productive specula-
tion? Consideration of such questions, I think, leads to a richer and more explana-
tory philosophy of science.
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